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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-3062 
____________ 
 
JOHN HARGRAVE, 
                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES RAMSEY; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-15-cv-00201) 
District Judge: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2017 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 9, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
John Hargrave was discharged from his position as a Philadelphia police officer in 
2012.  He sued the City of Philadelphia and its then-Police Commissioner, Charles 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Ramsey, arguing that his termination was unconstitutional.  The District Court rejected 
Hargrave’s claims.  We will affirm. 
I 
The Philadelphia Police Department has a policy under which officers are subject 
to dismissal if they engage in any action that constitutes a felony or misdemeanor that 
carries a potential sentence of more than one year of incarceration.  Neither a criminal 
conviction nor a pending criminal proceeding is necessary to initiate disciplinary action.  
In 2012, Hargrave was arrested and charged with offenses relating to an incident of 
domestic violence involving his wife.  The Department separately charged Hargrave with 
conduct unbecoming of a police officer and dismissed him from the force.  Two years 
later, following a trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, a jury found Hargrave 
not guilty of all charges related to the incident.  Hargrave sought reinstatement, but an 
arbitrator rejected the request. 
On January 16, 2015, Hargrave filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the constitutionality of his dismissal.  The 
complaint named the City and Commissioner Ramsey as defendants.  It alleged four 
counts: (1) race discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; (2) retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment; (3) 
municipal liability under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services;1 and 
                                              
1 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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(4) race discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s equal protection 
guarantee.  Defendants moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) on all but Hargrave’s federal equal protection claim.  On May 20, 2015, the 
District Court dismissed the First Amendment retaliation count without prejudice, 
declined to dismiss the Monell count, and dismissed the Pennsylvania equal protection 
count with prejudice.  Hargrave did not replead his First Amendment retaliation claim.  
Defendants thereafter moved for summary judgment on Hargrave’s federal equal 
protection and Monell claims.  In opposing defendants’ motion, Hargrave filed a Rule 
56(d) affidavit asserting the need for additional discovery.  The District Court granted 
defendants’ motion on June 8, 2016.  This appeal followed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over both the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment and its dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).2  We review 
for abuse of discretion the District Court’s refusal to reopen discovery upon presentation 
of a Rule 56(d) affidavit.3 
III 
                                              
2 EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 2015) (summary 
judgment); Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 174 n.7 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal). 
3 Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp., LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 310 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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Hargrave raises three arguments on appeal.  First, he contends that the District 
Court erroneously granted defendants summary judgment on his federal equal protection 
claim.  Second, he says that the District Court abused its discretion by not granting him 
more discovery to counter defendants’ summary judgment motion.  And third, he submits 
that the District Court should not have dismissed his First Amendment retaliation claim. 
A 
Hargrave, who is black, claims that the Department selectively enforced its 
reinstatement policy against him because of his race.  To establish a selective 
enforcement claim, Hargrave must show “(1) that he was treated differently from other 
similarly situated individuals, and (2) that this selective treatment was based on an 
unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor, or to 
prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.”4   “Persons are similarly situated under the 
Equal Protection Clause when they are alike ‘in all relevant aspects.’”5  Hargrave also 
bears the burden of proving “the existence of purposeful discrimination.”6   
We agree with the District Court that Hargrave failed make his case on both 
elements.  Hargrave produced no evidence of similarly situated white police officers who 
committed domestic assault (or engaged in other conduct warranting termination) but 
                                              
4 Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 184 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (ellipsis omitted) 
(quoting Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
5 Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). 
6 Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 273 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.3d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
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were not dismissed from the police department and denied reinstatement.  Absent such 
comparator evidence, Hargrave’s claim fails at the starting gate.  We likewise agree with 
the District Court that Hargrave failed to prove intentional discrimination by the City and 
Ramsey.  The District Court saw no such evidence in the record, and neither do we.  
Summary judgment on Hargrave’s equal protection claim was appropriate. 
B 
Hargrave next contends that the District Court abused its discretion by declining to 
grant additional discovery after he filed a Rule 56(d) affidavit in opposition to 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  This Court has interpreted Rule 56(d) to 
require “a party seeking further discovery in response to a summary judgment motion to 
submit an affidavit specifying, for example, what particular information is sought; how, if 
uncovered, it would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not previously been 
obtained.”7  Altogether missing from Hargrave’s affidavit is any explanation about how 
and why the information he sought could not have been obtained during discovery.  The 
District Court did not abuse its discretion. 
C 
Finally, Hargrave argues that the District Court should not have dismissed his First 
Amendment retaliation claim.  To establish such a claim, a public employee like 
Hargrave “must show that his speech is protected by the First Amendment and that the 
                                              
7 Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Sebelius, 674 F.3d 139, 157 (3d Cir. 
2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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speech was a substantial or motivating factor in what is alleged to be the employer’s 
retaliatory action.”8  A public employee’s statement is protected by the First Amendment 
when, inter alia, “the employee spoke as a citizen when making the statement” and “the 
statement involved a matter of public concern.”9  Hargrave’s complaint contains nothing 
more than conclusory references to prior speech in “opposition to racial discrimination 
and/or misuse of the criminal and disciplinary system.”10  Such threadbare statements are 
insufficient to state a plausible claim.  Especially after Hargrave declined the District 
Court’s invitation to amend his complaint, we will not now permit him a third bite at the 
apple. 
IV 
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
8 Flora, 776 F.3d at 174. 
9 Id. at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10 Compl. ¶ 51, J.A. 42. 
